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 This paper explores how existing push notification based two-factor 
authentication systems are susceptible to real-time man-in-the-middle relay attacks and 
proposes a system for mitigating such attacks. A fully functional reference system of the 
proposed mitigation was built and compared to an existing push notification two-factor 
authentication system while undergoing a real-time man-in-the-middle relay attack. The 
reference systems used cloud infrastructure for hosting, an Apple iPhone as the 
notification receiver, and Apple’s push notification service to send notifications. A 
publicly available tool for conducting real-time man-in-the-middle relay attacks was 
used to conduct the attacks. The results of the tests were recorded and contrasted to 
show how existing implementations fail to identify such attacks and how the proposed 
system could. It is recommended that the existing push notification two-factor 
authentication providers implement additional measures to protect users against real-
time man-in-the-middle relay attacks while appropriately weighing key usability issues. 
While the proposed mitigation system is shown to prevent such attacks, it has usability 






The common factors used to authenticate a person’s identity are knowledge, 
possession, inherence and location. These factors are known more colloquially as 
something you know, something you have, something you are or somewhere you are, 
respectively.  Multi-factor authentication (MFA) uses multiple factors to authenticate an 
identity [1]. The most widely used MFA is two-factor authentication which uses two 
factors to authenticate an end user. Most often, the two factors used in these systems 
are something you know (in the form of a password or PIN) and something you have. 
The something you have is commonly one of the following: a hardware token which 
generates one-time passwords (OTPs), a hardware token which is connected to the 
authenticating computer and transmits the requisite authentication data, a software 
token such as a mobile app which generates OTPs, a OTP sent via SMS or Email, or a 
push notification sent to the user’s mobile device which the user must choose to accept 
or decline [2, 3].  
Push notification two factor setups are very popular for their ease of use. Like 
SMS, push notifications are out of band from the authentication flow of the service the 
user is accessing and available on almost all mobile phones. In a Carnegie Mellon paper 
exploring two factor adoption among students and faculty at CMU, 91% of survey 
responders opted for push notifications, 21% used app-generated passcodes and 4% 
used hard tokens [4]. Push notifications are a common notification pattern for mobile 




used to deliver them to the end device. While there are multiple push notification RFCs 
[2, 3] in proposed standard status, implementations like Apple Push Notification service 
(APNS) are proprietary and there is no common, open to review implementation [5]. 
While most implementations appear to use the well-known quantity of TLS for secure 
connection establishment, there are other security features and patterns that are not 
easily reviewable in such proprietary implementations [6].  
 
Figure 1 - Apple Push Notification Service Architecture [5] 
  
MFA is a resilient measure to preventing simple phishing attacks which most 
commonly involves an attacker socially engineering a victim via email to visit an 
attacker-controlled site where the victim enters a valid set of credentials for a site or 
service they use. These attacker-controlled sites often mimic the appearance and 
behavior of the legitimate site or service the attacker is attempting to collect the 
victim’s credentials for. The attacker then is able to use the victim’s credentials to login 
to their account. Based on Verizon’s 2019 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), 32% 
of breaches involved phishing attacks and “was present in 78% of Cyber -Espionage 
incidents” [7]. Verizon’s DBIR report recommends MFA as a first line of defense against 




users who fall victim to phishing attacks believe they are entering their credentials into 
the legitimate site or server, it should be apparent that the user is also likely to enter 
their two factor credentials into the phishing site as well if prompted to do so. In the 
case of a TOTP token the attacker simply needs to enter both the user’s 
username/password combination and the TOTP token within the time the token is valid 
(normally they’re valid in 30 second windows although that window can be elongated to 
support better usability). While push notifications initially seem more resilient to such 
an attack since the user doesn’t need to enter anything into such a site, the likelihood a 
user will deny the push notification rather than accept it in a phishing scenario is low. 
This is because the victim believes the phishing site to be authentic and thus the push 
notification as well. Additionally, the victim has been conditioned to press accept on the 
notifications when they’re expecting them which means they’re less likely to inspect any 
additional validating information provided by the notification. Such an attack on push 
notifications or TOTP MFA requires the attacker to be actively passing along the stolen 
credentials to the legitimate site and executing the authentication flow in order to make 
use of the TOTP token in a timely manner or to make the push notification appear on 
the victim’s device auspiciously. 
Each of the aforementioned possession second factor implementations have 
their advantages and disadvantages which attempt to balance ease of use, 
recoverability, and security. OTPs sent via SMS are regarded as the weakest security 
option because of the weaknesses inherent in cellular networks and provider processes. 




employee accounts by performing a SIM swap and causing the SMS message containing 
the OTP to be sent to the attacker’s phone [8, 9]. Mobile apps serving as software 
tokens and hardware tokens which generate time-based one-time passwords (TOTPs) 
are one of the most popular options because of the ubiquity of mobile phones. TOTPs 
require the user to manually type them into the system they’re authenticating to which 
makes them susceptible to real time, man-in-the-middle relay phishing attacks. These 
phishing attacks involve an attacker tricking a victim into entering their two factors into 
a phishing site which automatically relays the user’s credentials to the intended site in 
real time. This attack renders the two-factor protections useless because the user will 
believe they’re entering their password and second factor into the intended site. The 
most effective possession factor is the hardware key which transmits the authentication 
data to the site. These hardware keys use the U2F protocol, and more recently 
WebAuthn, to communicate with the target application [10, 11]. These protocols 
mitigate phishing attacks by performing checks to ensure the target site is in fact the 
one intended and using public key cryptography. In order to compromise these 
hardware keys, the attacker would have to gain physical access to them which requires 
a great deal more complexity and risk than the aforementioned attacks. The issue with 
hardware keys is that support for them is extremely limited. Push notifications are 
becoming an increasingly popular second factor option because they occur out of band 
and require the user to accept or decline the attempted access to their account using 
their mobile device providing a notification in the event the user’s credentials were 




notifications are just as susceptible to man-in-the-middle phishing attacks as OTPs for a 
variety of factors which will be discussed further in future sections. 
In this paper we’ll show how potential main-in-the-middle relay phishing attacks 
against pushed based two-factor authentication would work and propose potential 
mitigations which can be implemented by sites or two-factor providers. Our mitigations 
will be layered onto existing push notification and web authentication protocols in order 
to provide users with less friction during authentication, maintain the current level of 
application development complexity, and reduce the risk of relying on a more untested, 






II. Related Work 
 
 There are several research implementations which look to deal with real-time 
phishing attacks, but few are focused on improving practical, widely used authentication 
techniques. Push based two factor authentication systems, in particular, have had 
limited research with respect to the ability to detect real-time MITM phishing attempts 
via connection metadata and parameters. 
 
Existing Protocol Based MITM Protections 
 
 HTTP over TLS/SSL is often regarded as a primary defense against MITM phishing 
attacks on the internet. However, HTTPS relies heavily on the end user identifying 
they’re visiting a malicious site. Users have been trained to trust sites where the 
browsers show a  green lock symbol, but browsers will show that symbol for any site 
with a valid certificate signed by a trusted CA. With the rise of free TLS certificate 
availability, such as through LetsEncrypt [12], such a certificate is trivial to obtain and 
only requires proving domain ownership. In June of 2019 the FBI released a public 
service announcement warning that cybercriminals are increasingly using valid TLS 
certificates for their malicious sites to exploit user’s trust in the browser’s lock icon [13]. 
Proposed techniques to deal with HTTPS MITM attacks include using third parties to 
check the presented certificate against a known good list or using a variation of a PAKE 
protocol such as DVCert described by Dacosta et al [14]. Such techniques present 




authentication mechanisms or TLS. In fact, Extended Validation (EV) Certificates, which 
are supposed to require significantly more checking by Certificate Authorities, have 
been shown to be very easy to get and are able to be manipulated to appear similar to 
existing companies. Research by Ian Carrol shows that he was able to obtain an EV 
certificate for “Stripe, Inc.” a company he had purported to setup for the sole purpose 
of obtaining the certificate [15]. This certificate would look like the legitimate Stripe’s 
certificate (Stripe is a common payment processor). This sort of easy manipulation to 
make a certificate for a fake site look legitimate makes user confusion and mistakes 
more likely. In a study by Adrienne Porter Felt, et. al., that looked at how existing 
browser security indicators were interpreted by users, the authors found that over 20% 
of users felt Chrome’s green lock icon meant the site was secure or “safe to enter data” 
on [16]. The study found that over 35% of users regarded the website as being a “secure 
site or page” or “safe” [16]. The trend to exploit such trust is on the rise as well. The 
2018 Phishing Trends & Intelligence Report by PhishLabs indicates that one third of all 





Using Connection Parameters to Detect MITM Attacks 
 
 The key challenges of detecting and mitigating real time MITM phishing attacks 
is that the server needs to validate that the client who is presenting it credential is in 
fact the expected client and the client needs to validate it is in fact talking to the 
expected server. A given TLS connection is in practice, not able to be tied to a user other 
than the authentication occurring at the application level. Rolf Oppliger et al explore 
how to use parameters of the established TLS connection in the authentication flow to 
prevent successful MITM attacks [18]. The authors propose generating a user access 
code per TLS session which is created by creating a hash of the TLS handshake messages 
and signing it with a private key from, preferably, a hardware token [18]. The idea is that 
the server will be able to determine whether the TLS session that the client used to 
deliver the credentials to the server is in fact the same one as the one the server 
received the credentials on. This approach is similar to the ZeKo protocol, which will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter, where the IP address of the client is 
transmitted which provides key information on the communication channel the server 
should expect to be communicating with. A thesis written by Radi Abubaker, Channel 
Based Relay Attack Detection Protocol, uses a very similar approach to detecting a relay 
in a wireless channel communication [19]. The approach, generally described, is to 
require the secure transmission of unique qualities of the wireless channel itself so that 
the receiving end can validate the channel it’s receiving on is in fact the same the sender 




 Zero knowledge, asymmetric cryptographic authentication systems are another 
commonly referenced solution for protecting against MITM phishing attempts, real time 
or otherwise. In the face of a relay MITM attack, these protocols must securely pass the 
user’s network address to the server. Doing this allows the server the opportunity to 
validate that the connection it has established is in fact the end user and not a MITM. 
Because the attacker will likely have a different network address (unless both the 
attacker and victim are behind the same NAT), the server is able to determine the 
attacker is not the legitimate end user they’re expecting to be connected to. The need 
for the client to securely disclose their IP address to the server is described as a key 
feature of ZeKo by Paul Knickerbocker in Combating Phishing Through Zero-Knowledge 
Authentication [20]. In ZeKo the client provides its IP address securely in order for the 
server to be able detect MITM relay attacks as well as replay attacks. These protocols 
suffer from similar issues as PAKE solutions for HTTPS in that they have the pitfall of 
requiring significant changes to existing authentication schemes [20]. 
 Another proposed solution from Italo Dacosta, et. al., proposed a means of using 
user application credentials with a PAKE protocol to provide the browser the expected 
certificate fingerprints that domain will use [21]. This allows the browser to securely 
check the certificate fingerprint against the stored expected fingerprint. If there is a 
mismatch between the fingerprints a man-in-the-middle is assumed to be occurring and 
the browser should halt communication [21]. It’s important to note the protocol only 
provides for server authentication as it relates to a particular domain and does not 





MITM Protections Integrated into the Application Layer 
 
 The reason MITM relay attacks can be successful with little knowledge of the 
authentication process is because in modern web authentication systems is that web 
servers inevitably return a session key, often in the form of a cookie, which is used to 
continuously authenticate with each subsequent request since HTTP is stateless. 
Obtaining one of these session keys, also known as session hijacking, allows an attacker 
to impersonate the legitimate user for future requests until the key expires. Since a real 
time, MITM relay attacker can simply pass valid authentication credentials and 
responses back and forth between the server and client they only need to wait for the 
server to present the session key as a cookie which they can acquire and reuse. This 
means the attacker does not need to actually have any knowledge of the user’s 
credentials as long as neither the client, nor the server, can detect the attacker in the 
middle prior to the server presenting the authentication cookie and the attacker is able 
to acquire the cookie in a readable form. The attacker will then be able to use the cookie 
undetected. Italo Dacosta, et. al., introduced a “one-time cookie” in their paper, One-
Time Cookies: Preventing Session Hijacking Attacks with Disposable Credentials [22]. In 
the paper, a method for one-time use cookies is proposed such that an attacker who 
hijacks a session will not be able to use the captured cookie or generate the next 
expected cookie to authenticate with [22]. One of the key strengths of this approach is 
the use of the URL in the HMAC portion of the one-time cookie. This means that a user 




would not be able to simply relay them to the target legitimate site. This method still 
would allow a MITM relay to succeed though because if the MITM relay site acquires 
the user’s credentials they can setup a valid session and gain all of the required secret 
material to generate the one-time cookies because neither the server, nor the client, is 
able to detect the attack occurring in real time.  
 
Real-Time Phishing Detection 
 
 Detecting phishing in real-time is often a difficult task evidenced by the lack of 
existing techniques for doing so. Most often browsers, such as Google Chrome [23], 
check domains prior to loading a web page against a blacklist to see if the domain has 
been identified as a phishing domain. The primary weakness of this approach is that 
phishing domains are constantly being setup and a new one that has seen little to no 
traffic is unlikely to have been identified as phishing. Users who are the first to visit a 
new phishing site will be unlikely to be alerted by their browser that the site is in fact a 
phishing site. 
 Two of the most common proposed approaches for real time detection of 
phishing sites are URL analysis and site content analysis. Since most phishing sites 
attempt to mimic a legitimate site as closely as possible, they’ll often use content by 
linking directly to the target legitimate site or they’ll save a copy of the site assets and 
render those with small modifications. There are even tools for quickly cloning a site 
such as setoolkit which comes with most distributions of Kali Linux [24]. One approach 




Websites By Looking at Them, details using the content of a site using computer vision 
and other techniques to determine how similar it is to a legitimate site [25]. PhishZoo 
saves profiles of specific sites and when a user visits any site with an unknown URL, that 
is a site that has not been saved as a profile, PhishZoo compares the unknown site’s 
content to all of the saved profiles to see if there is a match. If there is a match the site 
is deemed to likely be a phishing site. PhishZoo can be supplemented with existing URL 
heuristics, blacklist, and whitelist approaches. The approach has challenges due to how 
dynamic modern sites are as well as how often they are updated. This means the 
various site profiles have to be updated regularly and a site with too much dynamic 
content or a volatile layout may result in a high rate of false negatives. 
 Using heuristics or machine learning techniques to identify phishing URLs is 
another common technique. This approach uses various features of the URLs and 
domains to identify them as potential phishing sites. Such an approach is detailed by 
Jianyi Zhang and Yonghao Wang in A Real-time Automatic Detection of Phishing URLs 
[26]. The approach detailed in the paper uses a logistical regression classifier utilizing 
lexical features of the URL and whether the site is using a virtual host. Several well-
known data sets are used as training sets and the training is run once per day as the 
training sets are updated. This approach only works when the URL bears the qualities 
that match the training set features and if the attacker has been able to compromise the 
victim’s DNS infrastructure or internal network this approach will not detect it because 




attackers to evade detection because the approach is highly dependent on the training 
data set. 
 Another approach detailed in Beyond the Lock Icon: Real-time Detection of 
Phishing Websites Using Public Key Certificates uses features of website TLS certificates 
with a machine learning algorithm to detect phishing sites in real time [27]. The features 
used include the certificate authority name, valid dates, subject name, and extensions. 
By using a training set of certificates from identified phishing sites and from legitimate 
sites the classifiers are able to classify new phishing sites. The certificates that are 
classified as phishing must have certificates with features deemed similar to the 
phishing certificates in the training set by the classifiers. The authors note that their 
approach is more robust than URL and content analysis techniques, but the features 
used are susceptible to attacker manipulation and as a result allow a non-trivial 





III. Attack Scenario 
 
 The attack scenario this paper describes involves an attacker tricking a victim 
user into visiting a malicious site meant to appear as a legitimate site, also known as a 
phishing attack. Typically, in such a phishing attack, a user enters their credentials into 
the phishing site which can later be collected and used by an attacker in a manual or 
automated fashion (such as in a credential stuffing attacks[ref?]). However, if the victim 
user has two-factor authentication enabled on their account the attacker will not be 
able to successfully authenticate completely using the phished credentials because they 
will not have obtained usable two-factor credentials. If the attacker employs a real-time 
relay attack though, they are able to pass the user’s username and password as well as 
any valid two factor credentials to the target application as needed. The user will be 
unlikely to notice such an attack because they will be under the impression they’re 
logging in to the desired target application. The user’s only way to notice the attack is to 
notice the URI of the site they’re on is not the target application. In many cases this may 
be difficult for the user to notice because of limited UI real estate on mobile devices or 
URIs which appear to be very similar to the target application’s. Additionally, an attacker 
can have the malicious site use a TLS certificate which the user’s browser will show as 
valid and secure because all validation checks from the browser’s perspective will pass, 
i.e. the URI matches the alternate name of the certificate, the CA which signed the 
certificate is trusted by the browser, the certificate has not expired. This leads to a false 




browsers to mean the user is “safe” and “secure”. Because so much onus is on the end 
user to be able to identify when they’re not on the site they intend to be by thoroughly 
checking the URI, there is ample possibility for even the most technical users to make 
mistakes. To compound the problem further, when the two-factor authentication 
system a user has on their account is push notification based, they have even more 
responsibility to identify malicious logins. 
 Push based two-factor authentication has a few very strong advantages including 
convenience, ease of use, and a real time notification of when compromised credentials 
are used. The downsides, which have not been extensively publicized as of the time of 
writing, include a habitual behavior to accept such notifications. Statistics from push 
based two-factor providers are not readily available but it’s reasonable to assume that 
the vast majority of two-factor push notification requests are accepted because cases of 
compromised credentials would be relatively rare compared to normal login activity. 
This means a user has been trained to accept such notifications or otherwise not to 
inspect them closely to identify malicious logins when they’re expecting them. Another 
downside is that even for attentive users, aside from timing, their only means to identify 
a malicious login is to examine the IP address and associated IP’s geolocation if 
available. This is problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that an 
average user has no idea what their IP is nor any semblance of what a suspicious value 
would be. Providing geolocation data on the associated IP is helpful however, it can 
often be incorrect or confusing causing users to ignore it. For example, it is not 




completely different location than their current location. Additionally, if the user is 
accessing a resource on an internal network or they’re using a service which aggregates 
connections such as a VPN, their true external IP will be obscured or irrelevant. 
Attackers can also host their malicious application on cloud providers which will allow 
them to use IP addresses which will geolocate to a variety of locations, some of which 
may be close enough to a user to appear valid for even more technically savvy users. 
Some push notification two-factor providers, such as Microsoft, don’t even provide the 
client IP address or the associated geolocation data. This gives the user no opportunity 
to identify malicious logins. These issues with push notifications play perfectly into 
making a real-time relay phishing attack scenario viable. Microsoft’s push notification is 





Figure 2 - Microsoft Authenticator Two-Factor Push Notification [28] 
  
When a victim user is visiting a malicious application performing a real-time relay 
phishing attack, the user enters their credentials believing they’re accessing the desired 
target application. As a result, after the malicious application relays the victim user’s 
credentials to the target application it will send a two-factor push notification to the 
victim user’s mobile device. The user is likely to accept this two-factor authentication 
request because of the aforementioned reasons around trained behavior and lack of 
technical expertise. To compound the issue further, the user is unlikely to even suspect 
the request as malicious because they believe they’re logging in to the desired target 





Simulating a Real-Time Relay Phishing Attack 
 
To simulate the real-time relay phishing attack described previously, two web 
applications were created to serve as the target applications. One target web 
application was integrated with Duo Security’s two-factor push notification service via 
their .NET SDK [29]. To login to the application the user must enter their username and 
password on the login screen. After doing that successfully the web application uses 
Duo’s provided SDK to send a request to the Duo two factor service which then sends a 
push notification to the user’s mobile device. Once the user confirms the push 
notification the target web application will authenticate the user and allow them to visit 
authorized resources. The second target web application was integrated with the 
PushValidator two-factor push notification service which is the novel solution presented 
by this paper to mitigate the attack scenario previously described. The PushValidator 
solution is described in more detail in future sections. 
In the real-time relay attack scenario, there is a malicious application the user 
will visit which will masquerade as the target web application. It does this by, in real-
time, querying the login page and relaying it to the end user. The user enters their 
credentials which the malicious application relays to the target application over HTTP as 
a valid user would. This causes the target web application to send the two-factor push 
notification to the user’s mobile device. If the user accepts this push notification the 
target web application will authenticate the malicious application and provide it a 




the target application or the malicious application could continue to relay between the 
victim user and the target application. The malicious application in this simulation was 
created using Modlishka [30] which is a tool built to serve as a reverse proxy for 
legitimate sites while capturing credentials and cookies by parsing and rewriting the 
HTTP requests it’s proxying. 
The target applications were deployed to Azure Web App service [31] and 
publicly available over the internet. Likewise, Modlishka was deployed on an Azure VM 
running Debian 9.9 and the domain pushvalidator.com provided by Google Domain 
service pointed at the VM’s public IP to perform the successful proxying and credential 
capture. Additionally, Modlishka used a valid certificate for pushvalidator.com from 
LetsEncrypt [32], so that when visiting the site a victim would not be shown any security 
warnings. Modlishka was configured using a JSON file with options describing the 
domain pointing to it, the certificate, private key and CA it should use for TLS 
connections, the target web application it would proxy connections to, and what IP to 
bind to on the VM. An example configuration, with secrets redacted, is provided below. 
 
{ 
  "proxyDomain": "pushvalidator.com", 
  "listeningAddress": "0.0.0.0", 
  "target": "pushvalidatordemo.azurewebsites.net", 
  "targetResources": "", 
  "targetRules": "”, 
  "terminateTriggers": "", 
  "terminateRedirectUrl": "", 
  "trackingCookie": "id", 
  "trackingParam": "id", 
  "jsRules":"", 
  "forceHTTPS": false, 
  "forceHTTP": false, 
  "dynamicMode": false, 
  "debug": true, 
  "logPostOnly": false, 




  "log": "requests.log", 
  "plugins": "all", 
  "cert": "", 
  "certKey": "", 






IV. PushValidator Implementation 
 
In order to mitigate a real-time relay phishing attack, either the client or server 
needs to be able to detect that there is a man-in-the-middle proxying the requests and 
responses. To properly detect this, the server or client must have some way to 
determine that they are not connected directly to their expected peer. One of the most 
straightforward approaches to do this is to compare the expected IP of the peer to the 
IP they’re actually connecting to. An example of such an approach can be seen in ZeKo 
by Paul Knickerbocker where the client’s IP is provided via the proposed zero knowledge 
authentication protocol in order to detect a MITM attack [20]. Additional data points 
can be tested as well to confirm, such as the TLS server certificate fingerprint and URI. 
Additionally, the actual data points should be conveyed to their peer out of band and 
need to be tamperproof in order to ensure the man-in-the-middle is not able to modify 
them to match their current attack position or otherwise remove them. 
To implement such a solution for two-factor push notifications it is convenient to 
use the push notifications and subsequent responses from the user’s mobile device, as a 
medium to transport the actual data points to the target application via a third party 
two-factor provider. In order to simulate this end-to-end, a full two-factor service was 
built which consists of a web application a user can log into to register their device for 
the push notifications and where applications can register which will submit two-factor 
requests to be sent to the end user. An iOS app was also built which can receive push 




authentication response along with the data points to the two-factor authentication 
provider. A browser extension was also built, which serves to collect the actual data 
points from the user’s machine requesting to authenticate to the target web 
application. 
The flow of an authentication attempt is as follows: First a user enters their 
username and password into the target web application successfully. The target web 
application generates the payload for the two-factor authentication request containing 
the user’s username, client IP address and HMAC which it returns to the user’s browser 
to submit to the two-factor provider service. The browser (via JavaScript) submits the 
provided payload to the two-factor provider which then uses the username to find a 
registered device for that user and sends a push notification to it which contains the 
client’s IP and username. The user receives the push notification on the two-factor 
provider’s mobile application and upon accepting it must scan a QR code which will 
provide the server’s IP, URI and the certificate fingerprint of the web application the 
user is actually connecting to. The QR code is generated by the aforementioned 
extension installed in the user’s browser that is able to inspect the URI, IP and certificate 
of the site the user is actually on. The information from the QR code is then submitted 
back to the two-factor provider via a HTTP request from two-factor provider’s mobile 
application. The user’s browser, via JavaScript, retrieves the two-factor authentication 
result from the two-factor provider directly and then supplies it to the target web 
application. The target web application is then able to verify the response by comparing 




application symmetric key. The IP, URI, and certificate fingerprint the user is connecting 
to against their own actual values from the response are compared against the server’s 
known values to determine if there is an active MITM occurring. If there is an 
incongruency then the server is able to deny the authentication and take additional 
measures to mitigate further compromise of the user’s account. These actions could 
include locking the user’s account, sending them an alert via email or mobile push 
notification, or blacklisting connections from the attacker’s MITM IP. Figure 3 provides a 
detailed flow of the various responses and requests. 
 
 








Below are the individual components making up the PushValidator 
implementation described in more detail. These details include the associated 
infrastructure and configurations used to conduct tests and simulate various scenarios. 




This application is the two-factor push notification provider. It allows users to 
register their push notification mobile device using the PushValidator iOS app. It also 
allows application administrators and developers to register their application on the 
service. The application is responsible for receiving the two-factor authentication 
requests from the target applications, sending the two-factor push notification to the 
user’s registered device, and receiving the two-factor authentication result.  
The application is written using ASP.NET Core 2.1 and deployed to Azure Linux 
Web Apps Service. The database used is an Azure SQL database. The configuration 
options for the application include the database connection string, the credentials 
needed to send push notifications via the Apple Push Notification Service, and the 




 This application is the demo target web application which uses the PushValidator 




ASP.NET Core 2.1 and deployed to Azure Linux Web Apps Service. The database used is 
an Azure SQL database. The configuration options include the PushValidator application 
id, the PushValidator symmetric key, and PushValidator URI for submitting two-factor 
requests, the PushValidator URI for checking the result of two-factor requests, the 




This application is the demo target web application which uses Duo Security as 
its two-factor push notification provider. The application is written using ASP.NET Core 
2.1 and deployed to Azure Linux Web Apps Service. The database used is an Azure SQL 
database. The configuration options include the Duo API hostname, the Duo secret key, 
the Duo integration key, the database connection screen, and the application logging 
level. The code is available on GitHub [33]. 
 
PushValidator iOS App 
 
 This application is the iOS app installed on the user’s phone which the user must 
register with the PushValidator Service. The PushValidator app receives the two-factor 
push notification, scans the QR code from the PushValidator Browser Extension, and 
sends the authentication response and data points from the QR code to the 
PushValidator Service. The application is written using Swift 5.0 and installed on an 
iPhone 6S running iOS version 12.3. The code is available on GitHub [34]. 
 





 This application is the browser extension that must be installed on the browser 
the user uses to login to the target web application. The extension collects the IP, URI, 
and certificate fingerprint of the site the user is authenticating to and generates a QR 
code containing the data for the PushValidator iOS app to scan.  
The extension is written for the Firefox web browser. No other browsers 
currently support the ability to acquire a site’s certificate fingerprint. The extension 
works in the TOR web browser because it’s a customized version of Firefox. The code is 
available on GitHub [35]. 
 
VPN & VPN Client 
 
The VPN service used during testing was the Vypr VPN service [38]. The Vypr 




The Tor browser was downloaded from the official Tor website [39]. The Tor 




Data Flow Authentication and Integrity 
 
 Each request and response must be properly authenticated and protected 
against modification between the target application, the two-factor authentication 
provider, and the user’s mobile device. To ensure that is the case modern cryptographic 
techniques are used in this implementation. To implement these techniques properly 
the registration process of the mobile device and the application become paramount in 
order to securely exchange the relevant cryptographic secrets securely. Many of these 
techniques are attempting to emulate what existing two-factor authentication providers 
currently do. The techniques implemented are described below. 
Figure 3 show the request and response flow of an authentication attempt in the 
described implementation. These requests and responses apply cryptographic 
techniques to each message in order to authenticate and maintain integrity of each 
request and response. The registration process is used to share the cryptographic 
secrets between the relevant parties. Request #3 and response #7 use a HMAC of the 
message to authenticate the sender and guarantee the integrity of the message. This is 
done by taking each field of the message and concentrating them to serve as the data 
input to the HMAC and then using a shared secret as the symmetric key which the two-
factor provider and the target web application both possess. The symmetric key is 
generated by the two-factor provider and then given to the web application developer 
via a web portal who is then responsible for correctly formatting and building their 
requests. The generation of the payload with the HMAC and verification of the response 




the security of the push notification service and mobile ecosystem. The security 
properties of those are out of scope for this implementation  
A user must register their mobile device with the two-factor provider through 
their web portal. The registration process for a device requires a user to login to the 
two-factor provider web portal where a device Id and a symmetric key is generated. 
These are shared with the device via a QR code which must be scanned using the two-
factor provider’s mobile app. The two-factor provider’s mobile app then generates an 
asymmetric key pair using the device’s secure enclave (if available) and any additional 
data needed to send it push notifications. In the case of APNS a device token is required. 
The public key, device token, and device Id are sent back to the two-factor provider via a 
HTTP request along with a HMAC. The HMAC uses the previously supplied symmetric 
key and the concatenation of the aforementioned parameters as the data. Once the 




Figure 4 - Device Registration 
 
Response #6 in Figure 3 uses asymmetric cryptography to authenticate and 
verify the integrity of the message by taking the parameters of the message 
concatenating them and then signing them with the previously generated private key in 




provider is able to validate the signature by using the previously provided public key. 
Once the request is validated it saves the results which the original web application 
queries in response #7  to determine whether to authenticate the user. The structure of 
the response in #7 is identical to Table 2 except instead of using a ECDSA signature from 
the device to verify the authenticity and integrity of the message, a HMAC is generated 
using the message contents and the application symmetric key. The user is either 
authenticated or denied via response #8 as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Data Points used to Verify the Client Connection 
 
 The implementation gathers the server IP, URI, and certificate fingerprint that 
the user is actually connecting to. These values are submitted back to the target web 
application through the two-factor provider so that the target web application can 
evaluate whether the user is actually connecting to it or to an unknown server which is 
presumably malicious. The IP is used because typically web applications are available at 
a consistent set of addresses that the web application owner is aware of. This can often 
be a set of load balancers, reverse proxies or other connection aggregator 
infrastructure. This is not always true because of cloud infrastructure though and as a 
result other data points are needed to help the target web application have enough 
context to make an appropriate authentication decision.  
 One of the other data points used is the target web application URI. In most 
phishing attack scenarios, the URI will be different from the target web applications 




traffic. The URI, unlike the IP address, is going to be extremely consistent for a web 
application and unlikely to vary, meaning multiple values would not need to be 
configured for the check to be successful. There is the possibility that an attacker is able 
to modify DNS responses so that the legitimate URI points to the phishing site’s IP or 
change the routing of the user’s traffic to send requests and responses to the phishing 
site. In those cases, the URI would match the legitimate sites, but the victim would be 
visiting a phishing site. 
 Certificate metadata, specifically the certificate fingerprint, which is a hash of the 
certificate, can be used to compare the certificate presented by the phishing site against 
the one the target web application uses. It would be extremely unlikely an attacker is 
able to get the exact certificate used by the target web application and provide it in such 
a way the web browser will mark it as valid. The certificate used by a web application for 
a particular domain will be consistent like the URIs used. 
 Making these values match in aggregate raises the bar of the attacker’s 
complexity significantly. Additional data points and checks can be used to make an 
attack even less likely. For example, examining the server IP the user is connecting to 
against known blacklists, threat intelligence feeds, and WhoIs data can reveal obvious 
attackers. Additionally, the target web application can implement logic to compare the 
server IP data point to authenticating client IPs and if there is a match there is a 
likelihood that IP is a proxy relaying requests. Such a proxy may or may not be malicious, 




application must weigh the likelihood of false positives and usability that such additional 
checks and data points will incur. 
 Unfortunately, non-malicious proxies may be flagged by this implementation as 
being malicious. The URI would match in such scenarios, but the IP and certificate 
fingerprint will not. A potential workaround would be to whitelist such proxies’ IP and 
certificate fingerprints. However, this is not ideal and compromises much of the benefit 
provided by this implementation because a malicious phishing site that resides behind 
such a whitelisted proxy  will be more difficult to detect. In such a scenario the phishing 
site would more likely to be able to appear as the whitelisted proxies’ IP and certificate 
and the target web application’s URI because a LAN environment generally has fewer 
protections against such attacks. Other non-malicious connection aggregation points 
such as TOR nodes and VPN servers may also cause this implementation to flag 
requests. These scenarios are tested with the PushValidator and Duo demo applications 
under normal circumstances, without an attacker involved. 
 
Browser Extension Role and Mobile Device Alternatives 
 
 This implementation requires a browser extension because a trusted piece of 
software, separate from the JavaScript and HTTP provided by the target web 
application, must be used to gather the actual data points such as the server IP, URI and 
certificate fingerprint. The target web application could provide these values but 
because the MITM would be able to modify what is shown to the user to match the 




would need to include a HMAC or similar authenticity and integrity check with the data. 
Such a check would require additional key material to be either passed via the 
connection which is insecure or would need to have been pre-shared with the user as 
part of a registration step. This adds a great deal of complexity and the usability of such 
an implementation is greatly diminished. 
As a result, the most convenient option that provides robust integration across 
many platforms is currently a browser extension. Firefox in particular provides the 
ability to examine the server certificate and capture the certificate fingerprint. Chrome 
does not currently provide such an API for its browser extensions. Edge was not tested 
because at the time of writing it is undergoing a major overhaul to be based on the 
chromium browser and so is unlikely to provide the API (since Chrome which also based 
on chromium doesn’t) or be stable enough to develop for. 
 There are downsides to the browser extension such as  a more arduous process 
for the end user because of the additional software that must be installed for every 
browser they use. The user must also go through the additional step of scanning a QR 
code after accepting a push notification two-factor request. This additional step is the 
weakest point in the process as it relies heavily on the user themselves. Potential 
mistakes include a user scanning a QR code for the site they’re not actually 
authenticating to, the attacker convincing the user to scan the QR code for the 
legitimate site rather than the phishing site, or the user just not having the technical 




 In the case where the device the user is requesting authentication from is a 
mobile device, different approaches are required depending on the mobile browser OS. 
A browser extension is more difficult on iOS mobile devices because iOS only allows for 
limited capability browser extensions through its Web Kit API which is what all iOS 
browsers are based on, not just Safari [40]. There are application extensions, called 
action and sharing extensions, which allow limited inter-application interaction. 
Currently, the workaround idea on iOS would be to require the mobile device to open a 
browser to the site within the two-factor provider mobile app in order to access the 
relevant data points. The downside to this approach is that for any target web 
application that uses the described implementation would only be able to be accessed 
on an iOS mobile device from the two-factor provider’s app. Android mobile devices can 
use browser extensions so the approach would be for the extension to provide a deep 
link to the two-factor provider mobile app with the data points as parameters [41]. In 
the reference implementation here an iOS app is developed but an Android app was 
not. The developed iOS app does not provide a solution for accessing the target web 








The following tables show the fields contained in each message during an 
authentication request and device registration 
 
Two-Factor Authentication Request 
 
This is the request sent from the target application to the two-factor service 
provider after the user has successfully entered their username and password. This will 
trigger the provider to send a push notification to the PushValidator app on the mobile 
device the authenticating user has previously registered with the two-factor provider. 
 
Field Type Description 
ApplicationId String Web Application’s unique identifier used to 
grab associated application’s data such as 
name and symmetric key. 
Secret String HMAC generated from a string consisting of 
all other fields concatenated and the target 
application’s symmetric key 
Username String Username used to make the authentication 
request. 
ClientIp IP Address IP address of the client requesting 
authentication 
Timestamp DateTime Timestamp of request 
Table 1 - Two-Factor Authentication Request from Target Application to PushValidator Service 
The TransactionId is returned in response to this request by the PushValidator service to 
the target application which allows the target application to subsequently query the 





Two-Factor Authentication Result 
 
Retrieved from the Two-Factor provider by the web application periodically 
polling the provider endpoint using the transaction id as a lookup key. The two-factor 
provider is able to provide the result once the user has sent a response from the Push 
Validator app on their mobile device. 
 
Field Type Description 
TransactionId String Unique value for tracking the request 
Result String Success or Failure 
ServerIp String IP of the server the client is authenticating to 
CertificateFingerprint String Fingerprint of the certificate the client is 
authenticating to 
ServerURI String URI of the server the client is authenticating 
to 
Signature String HMAC generated from a string consisting of 
all other fields concatenated and the target 
application’s symmetric key 








Sent by the two-factor service provider to the PushValidator app on the 
authenticating user’s mobile device. This triggers the user to accept or decline the 
authentication request and then to scan the QR code generated by the PushValidator 
browser extension which contains the authentication data points to be sent back to the 
two-factor service provider and ultimately the target web application. 
Field Type Description 
Username String Username used to make the authentication 
request. 
ApplicationName String Web Application name user is attempting to 
authenticate to that is registered with the 
PushValidator service. 
GeoLocation** String Geolocation of the ClientIp based on external 
GeoIP databases. 
ClientIp String IP address of client requesting authentication 
TransactionId String Unique value for tracking the request 
Timestamp DateTime Timestamp of request 
Table 3 - Content of Push Notification message sent from PushValidator Service to the authenticating user's mobile 
device 






Push Notification Response 
 
Response sent by the PushValidator app to the PushValidator service after the 
user has denied the request or accepted it and scanned the QR code generated by the 
PushValidator browser extension. This message is subsequently relayed to the target 
application with a HMAC of the contents generated using the target application’s 
symmetric key rather than the device’s ECDSA signature. 
 
Field Type Description 
UserId String Unique user identifier 
TransactionId String Unique value for tracking 
the request 
ClientIp** IP Address User’s actual IP address of 
authenticating client. 
ServerURL* String User’s actual URL they’re 
authenticating to 
ServerIP* IP Address Actual IP address hosting 
the application the user is 
attempting to authenticate 
to. 
CertificateFingerprint* String Actual fingerprint of 
certificate presented by the 
application the user is 
attempting to authenticate 
to. 
Signature String Cryptographically signed 
concatenated string of all 
other fields in request using 
the private key stored 
securely on the user’s 
device.  
Table 4 - Response to the Push Notification sent from the PushValidator iOS App to the PushValidator Service 
* Obtained from the PushValidator browser extension. 







Sent by the device during the registration process after scanning the QR code 
generated by the two-factor provider which contains the device id and a symmetric key. 
The symmetric key is used to generate a HMAC of the response data to validate this 
message is from the expected device. 
 
Field Type Description 
DeviceId String Id of device provided by the QR code during 
initial registration 
Secret String HMAC  generated by a string of all other 
fields in this message concatenated and the 
symmetric key provided by the QR code 
during registration 
PublicKey String Public Key of the corresponding private key 
generated by the Push Validator app on the 
user’s mobile device that is being registered. 
The public key will be used to validate future 
push notification responses that will have 
contain a signed data string. 
DeviceToken String Token needed by the Push Validator two-
factor provider service to send push 
notifications through Apple’s push 
notification service. 







Aside from the additional authentication validation provided by the described 
implementation, there are additional security benefits that can be derived. One such is 
immediate threat intelligence data about phishing sites that target the web application’s 
users. When an authentication attempt is deemed to be potentially malicious, the 
server IP, URI and certificate fingerprint collected from the attempt can be stored and 
tracked by the web application or two-factor provider. The benefit to the web 
application is more siloed as it will only be able to see the malicious applications 
targeting its users, but this provides the ability to prevent connections from ever 
starting by blacklisting and denying match IP addresses or alerting their entire user base 
to such sites. The two-factor provider stands to gain even more benefit because they’ll 
be able to aggregate such data across all applications and users. This in turn allows them 
to similarly build blacklists of the server IPs, URIs and certificates of such malicious 
phishing applications. The provider can use these blacklists to deny requests users 
mistakenly accept or ones that the target web application may incorrectly accept (since 
the acceptance logic is ultimately up to the target web application) across all of their 
customers. So, if several users from customer A has their login attempt flagged which all 
match a particular set of data points then the two-factor provider can proactively block 







 Beyond the issues with incorrectly flagging legitimate proxies discussed above, 
there are other downsides to this implementation which may limit its usability. First, 
while having to have a separate mobile application for the two-factor provider is 
somewhat of an inconvenience, it is commonplace for most two-factor providers and is 
definitively the case with all push notification two-factor providers because of how 
mobile push notifications work. The extra piece of trusted software, in this 
implementation the browser extension, is an additional hassle. The browser extension is 
easy to install and non-invasive but in certain high security or corporate environments 
there may be significant limitations on installing such extensions. Additionally, it is 
another piece of software that must be maintained and secured and thus additional 
attack surface for an attacker to target. It is a crucial step to the implementation, so it is 
likely to be  heavily focused on by attackers. The flip side is that the browser extension 
code and purpose is very simple because it simply provides a QR code with some basic 
details of the site the user is currently on. Additionally, the browser extension 
ecosystem has been much maligned over the past few years with no end in sight due to 
malicious copies of existing extensions being easy to develop and publish to the 
extension marketplaces. There are few checks in place to prevent malicious replicas of 
an extensions so if an attacker was able to convince a user to install one in place of the 
trusted one from the two-factor provider they could circumvent the protections 
provided. There is the potential for cryptographic techniques to be added to ensure the 




correct extension, but these are likely to add more cumbersome registration and 
installation requirements. 
 Having the target web application ultimately perform the logic to authenticate 
the user based on the response data points provided by the mobile application to the 
two-factor provider is an opportunity for issues to arise as well. Namely the target web 
application could have bugs in their implementation that incorrectly regard the data 
points provided as valid when they should not be. The web application developer may 
also be unable to gather the expected values for the data points or otherwise unable to 
dynamically change them at runtime which results in a high rate of false positives. This 
case is more likely for the server IP data points as discussed previously. Having the two-
factor provider perform such logic would ease this burden but would require the target 
web application developer to provide the expected data point values such as the server 
IPs, URIs and certificate fingerprints to the two-factor provider. Another solution could 
be for the two-factor provider to provide SDKs that contain pre-built code for 
interacting with the two-factor provider service from the target web application code 
that require minimal development effort. This is in fact what Duo Security does [29] and 
how the sample attack was created. The additional downside with the SDK approach is 
that the two-factor provider must provide several different SDKs, one for each 
programming language and web application framework. 
 One of the biggest issues with this implementation is that if an attempt is flagged 
it means the user has already provided their username and password to the malicious 




whereby the target web application should no longer accept those credentials and if the 
user has used those same credentials at other sites, they should reset them there too. 
There is no clear workaround to this issue other than inverting the order of when 
credentials are provided. In such a scenario the web application would require the user 
to enter their username first which would cause the push notification authentication 
process to fire first, once that process is successful then the target web application 
would prompt the user for their password as the second factor. This prevents the 
malicious phishing site from obtaining the user’s password in scenarios where the 
described implementation flags the authentication attempt as potentially malicious. 
 This implementation relies on the security of additional third parties, namely the 
push notification service and the two-factor authentication providers. This is not 
uncommon in today’s modern web application and authentication landscape but should 
be considered in web application developers threat modeling exercises. Because these 
providers are often closed source and do not allow open external penetration testing or 
audits, they are essentially black boxes which users and developers must trust to 
provide such services securely. This is obviously not ideal for high security 
environments. The cryptographic techniques used in the described implementation do 
attempt to mitigate any security issues with the push notification services by signing and 
verifying the responses from the devices with asymmetric keys. However, the use of 
symmetric keys and holding device responses diminishes the overall security posture by 
making the two-factor authentication provider a potential weak point in the process. A 




user’s device public key directly from the user and then provide it to the two-factor 
authentication provider. The two-factor provider could then provide the original 
response message from the device to the target web application who could 








The following scenarios test Duo and PushValidator two-factor services. For the 
attack scenario the setup described on page 18 s is used. The other components are 
described under the Implementation Components section.  
 
Testing Modlishka Against an Application using Duo Two-Factor Push Notifications 
 
 The target application in this scenario used Duo Security as its two-factor push 
notification provider. The target application was a scaffolded ASP.NET Core 2.1 web app 
using the built in ASP.NET Core Identity framework for authentication. Minor 
modifications were made to the scaffolded application to integrate Duo. Those changes 
include adding two controller methods, one to create the authentication request for the 
Duo service which is passed to the Duo provided JavaScript and another to verify the 
response from the Duo service. The generation of the Duo request and verification of 
the subsequent response were handled by Duo’s .NET SDK library. Minor build related 
modifications were made to the library because as of the time of writing it was target 
only .NET 3.5 which is not compatible with .NET Core. The target web application was 
run on Azure’s Linux Web App service under the Basic tier. Duo’s iOS mobile app was 
installed on an iPhone 6S device using iOS v12.3. An image of the login page of the Duo 






Figure 5 - Duo Demo Application 
  
There was an initial registration step whereby the user was created within the 
target web application where two-factor authentication had to be enabled. An initial 
login attempt was conducted to register the user’s device with the Duo service. The 
attack scenario assumes those steps had already been completed prior. 
 Figure 6 shows the initial login page for the target web application with the key 
indicator the attack is ongoing being the URI. It should be noted the browser is showing 






Figure 6 - Duo Demo Application Login with Attack in Progress 
 
Figure 7 shows the demo application’s two-factor page where the Duo JavaScript 






Figure 7 - Duo Demo Application Push Two-Factor Page with Attack in Progress 
 
Figure 9 shows the push notification received on the user’s mobile device. Interestingly 
the IP address of the user shown in Figure 9 is in fact correct and not of the attacker’s 
application IP. The attacker’s logs in Figure 8 from the Modlishka application show that 
the man-in-the-middle real-time relay attack is successful and the 
AspNetCore.Identity.Application cookie is obtained. With this cookie the attacker is able 





Figure 8 - Modlishka MITM Duo Attack Log 
 
The first key take away is that the Duo service is seemingly unaware or otherwise does 
nothing about the connection having a man in the middle. The attacker is able to collect 
the user’s session cookie after the two-factor push notification is accepted and the 
target web application receives the successful response from Duo’s JavaScript.  To make 
matters worse the client IP address shown in the push notification is that of the user’s 
browser which seems to have been collected by the Duo service itself from the request 
made from the Duo JavaScript. This means the user has absolutely no indication from 
the two-factor provider that there is a man in the middle since the user’s IP and related 
geolocation are correct and are the key data points a user is expected to use to identify 











Figure 10 - Duo Demo Application Successful Login with Attack in Progress 
 
Setup of PushValidator Service 
 
A user who wishes to authenticate to an application using the PushValidator 
service must register their device with the PushValidator service via a web application 
interface. 
Figure 11 shows the page a user sees when registering their device. Their 
presented a QR code which contains their device ID and a symmetric key. The user then 
selects the register button on the PushValidator iOS app which prompts the user to scan 
the QR code. Once the QR code is scanned the device generates a public/private key 
pair in its secure enclave. The PushValidator app then takes the public key, the device 




aforementioned fields using the symmetric key from the QR code and submits that to 
the PushValidator service to complete registration. The message is shown in Table 5.  
 
Figure 11 - Registering a device in the PushValidator service 
 
An application developer must register their application with the PushValidator 
service in order to use it as a two-factor provider. To do this the developer logins in to 
the PushValidator service and receives an application ID and a symmetric key which they 
must use with the PushValidator SDK for their web application. Figure 12 shows the 






Figure 12 - Application registration in the PushValidator service 
 
Testing Modlishka Against Application using PushValidator 
 
 The target web application in this scenario uses the described PushValidator 
implementation as its two-factor push notification provider. The target application was 
a scaffolded ASP.NET Core 2.1 web app using the built in ASP.NET Core Identity 
framework for authentication. Minor modifications were made to the scaffolded 
application to integrate PushValidator. Those changes include adding two controller 
methods, one to create the authentication request for the PushValidator service which 
is passed to the PushValidator provided JavaScript and another to verify the response 
from the PushValidator service. The generation of the PushValidator request and 
verification of the subsequent response were handled by PushValidator’s .NET SDK 




Basic tier. PushValidator’s iOS mobile app was installed on an iPhone 6S device using iOS 
v12.3. An image of the login page of the Duo demo application with the normal URI is 
show in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13 - PushValidator Demo Application 
  
There was an initial registration step whereby the user was created within the 
target web application where two-factor authentication had to be enabled. The user 
also had to login to register their device with the PushValidator service. The attack 
scenario assumes those steps had already been completed prior. 
 Figure 15 shows the push notification received from the PushValidator service. 
The IP of the user shown is that of the attacker because the target application is 




correct. After clicking on the check mark the user will be prompted to scan a QR code 
generated by the PushValidator browser extension. 
 
 






Figure 15 - PushValidator iOS Push Notification 
 
The QR code is shown in Figure 16 and has the server IP, URI and certificate 
fingerprint of the attacker’s application. Those values are sent back to the target web 






Figure 16 - PushValidator Demo Application Two-Factor Push Notification Page with Attack in Progress 
 
Included are images showing the user authenticating to the target web 
application, the PushValidator JavaScript submitting the authentication request and 
waiting on a response, the push notification received on the user’s mobile device and 
the attacker’s logs from the Modlishka application. 
 The target web application is able to identify that the connection has an active 
MITM because the server IP, URI and certificate fingerprint do not match the 
application’s known respective values. The application then denies the attempt and the 
attacker is never able to obtain a valid session cookie. An interesting implementation 
difference between Duo and the described PushValidator implementation is that the 




in the PushValidator implementation. This results in the user being able to see the 
attacker’s application IP address as the authenticating IP in the push notification. This 
gives the user an increased chance of catching such a MITM attack compared to Duo’s 
implementation.  
It’s likely Duo made their choice because having the application developer be 
responsible for collecting the user’s IP is likely to be too complex for the average 
developer and thus an unreliable piece of data. As an example of the complexity of 
collecting the user’s IP accurately, during the implementation of PushValidator the 
client’s IP was originally collected via the RemoteIpAddress property on the 
HTTPContext.Connection object provided by the ASP.NET Core SDK, however when 
deploying the application to Azure this value was incorrect because Azure performs its 
own reverse proxying of the connection in order to perform its own TLS termination so 
the implementation instead had to collect the IP from a HTTP header provided by the 
Azure reverse proxy, HttpContext.Request.Headers["X-Client-IP"]. It’s important to note 
that the reverse proxy provided by Azure is a black box and most developers would be 
completely unaware it existed. PushValidator performs as expected and catches the 
real-time relay MITM attack provided by Modlishka in this scenario. 
 
Testing PushValidator with a Client using a VPN  
 
 The target web application, user, and mobile device are the same as in the above 




connection. The VPN connection is a commercial VPN service where all network traffic is 
tunneled through it. There is no attacker in this scenario. 
 The user logins as previously described into the PushValidator demo application 
using their username and password. They then see the page shown in Figure 17 which 
triggers the push notification seen in Figure 18. 
  
 





Figure 18 - PushValidator iOS App Push Notification Initiated by User Login through a VPN 
 
The client IP shown in Figure 18 is that of the VPN connections exit point and not that of 
the user’s actual public IP. The QR code shown in Figure 17 has the correct values for 
the PushValidator demo application and the login is successful after the user accepts the 
notification in Figure 18 and scans the QR code when prompted. Figure 19 shows the 






Figure 19 - PushValidator Demo Application Successful Login with User Accessing through a VPN 
 
The PushValidator implementation is shown to work with a VPN service and behaves the 
exact same as Duo does. 
 
Testing PushValidator with a Client using TOR Browser 
 
The target web application, user, and mobile device are the same as in the above 
scenario except the user is connecting to the target web application through the TOR 
network. The connection is established using a special browser, specifically the official 
TOR browser, which is a derivative of the Firefox browser modified to route its traffic 
through the TOR network. 
Figure 20 shows the PushValidator demo application two-factor login page 




the PushValidator iOS app. The push notification is shown in Figure 21. Upon accepting 
the push notification, the user is prompted to scan a QR code shown in Figure 22. The 
values presented by the QR code are shown more clearly in Figure 23. The server IP is 
notably 0.0.0.0 which is unsurprising given how Tor routes its traffic. The value is likely 
being obfuscated or is otherwise unavailable as a result. 
 





Figure 21 - PushValidator iOS App Push Notification Initiated by user Logging in with the TOR browser 
 





Figure 23 - Caption showing parsed PushValidator QR code data 
 
The server IP being 0.0.0.0 results in the PushValidator application rejecting the login 
since it doesn’t match its IP. As is, PushValidator will not work when accessing an 
application via the Tor browser. 
 
Testing Duo with a Client using a VPN  
  
The target web application, user, attacker and mobile device are the same as in 
the above scenario except the user is connecting to the target web application through 
a VPN connection. The VPN connection is a commercial VPN service where all network 




 Figure 24 shows the user via a VPN connection accessing the Duo demo 
application two-factor login page which triggers a push notification to be sent to the 
user’s mobile device. Figure 25 shows the subsequent push notification the user 
receives. The IP address of the client is the server the user’s connection exits through 
and the IP is geolocated to Ashburn, VA. This geolocation is less than 150 miles from the 
actual IP address of the client.  
 
 





Figure 25 - Duo iOS App Push Notification Initiated by User Logging in through a VPN 
  
The user is able to successfully authenticate to the application. It should be noted Duo 
does provide additional settings to prevent logins from anonymous networks such as 
TOR and VPN services. 
 
Testing Duo with a Client using TOR Browser 
 
The target web application, user, and mobile device are the same as in the above 
scenario except the user is connecting to the target web application through the TOR 
network. The connection is established using a special browser, specifically the official 
TOR browser, which is a derivative of the Firefox browser modified to route its traffic 
through the TOR network. 
Figure 26 shows the user logging in via the Tor browser to the Duo demo 




notification to the Duo app on the user’s mobile device which is shown in Figure 27. The 
IP address notably has no geolocation tied to it and as a result is shown as unknown. 
 
 





Figure 27 - Duo iOS App Push Notification Initiated by User Logging in with the Tor browser 
 
The user is able to successfully authenticate to the application. It should be noted Duo 
does provide additional settings to prevent logins from anonymous networks such as 








Existing two-factor mobile push notification based authentication systems have 
weak capabilities to help user’s identify malicious logins in the case of real-time relay 
MITM phishing attacks. The UX and data points provided via the push notifications rely 
too heavily on an average user understanding networking concepts. Additionally, as of 
the time of writing it does not appear any system attempts to pull back useful data 
points about the client that is actually attempting authentication in order to make an 
evaluation that the current site the user is on is actually the one they intend. The 
PushValidator system described in this paper, has been shown to be able to detect real-
time relay MITM phishing attacks against mobile push based two-factor authentication 
systems. The vast majority of modern two-factor systems in use are unable to detect 
such an attack but push notification based systems are well positioned to be able to. 
The PushValidator system shows how push notification two-factor systems can leverage 
their existing out of band communication channel and mobile apps to relay additional 






VII. Future Work 
 
Future work could focus on determining ways to identify legitimate proxy and 
connection aggregators vs malicious real-time relay MITM phishing attacks since both 
exhibit extremely similar behavior. As described, this may involve whitelisting such 
legitimate proxies but there may be additional data points or connection properties 
which allow the target web application to discern a legitimate proxy versus a MITM 
phishing attempt. For example, there may be a way to fingerprint standard legitimate 
HTTP proxies based on connection metadata. 
Another topic of interest would be further mitigating the effect of a 
compromised two-factor authentication provider. Discussed previously, if the target 
web application collects and distributes the user’s mobile device public key then it can 
authenticate and validate device authentication responses independently of the two-
factor service provider. This would mean even if the two-factor provider is compromised 
the target web application would be still be able to detect modified or spoofed device 
authentication responses. Additionally, to further expand such an approach, it may be 
preferable to completely remove the two-factor authentication provider from the 
equation and simply provide an SDK that contains all relevant functionality for the target 
web application to send push notifications, register devices and receive authentication 
responses. 
Identifying additional authentication data points may be an interesting area to 




negatives in such systems. The data points may also be provide additional benefits with 
regards to threat hunting or may be useful in other security contexts. Research into 
novel ways of using the provided parameters to perform automated threat hunting and 








To describe the attacks and proposed mitigation implementation some industry 
standard terminology is used along with some terms specific to the proposed 
implementation. The following definitions are provided to help eliminate any confusion. 
 
Authentication data points – Data collected to helped validate that the server the user 
is connecting to is in fact the target web application 
 
MITM – Man-in-the-middle, meaning there is an entity between two communicating 
parties that is either able to view or manipulate the two parties’ communications. 
 
PushValidator – Described implementation to mitigate real-time relay attacks against 
mobile push notification two-factor systems. 
 
Real-time MITM relay phishing attack – Scenario where an attacker emulates a target 
application by relaying requests and responses between the target application and the 
victim allowing the attacker to pass legitimate credentials to the target web application 
and upon successful authentication intercept persistent access cookies and tokens. 
 
Target application – Application to which the phishing victim is attempting to 
authenticate  
 
Two-factor [authentication] provider – Provides the target web application a means to 
send authentication requests which are then pushed to the user’s mobile device and 
then is responsible for processing and storing the response 
 
User – Client user attempting to authenticate to a particular application or service 
 
User mobile device – Mobile device user receives push notifications from the two-factor 
provider on via the provider’s app and is responsible for collecting the authentication 
data points 
 
Victim – A user who has fallen for a phishing attack and had their credentials 
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